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Miller v. Johnson:
Drawing the Line on Racial Gerrymandering
INTRODUCTION

Though often the object of a cartoonist's pen,' political redistricting2
is a serious process by which group and individual interests are balanced.3
Intensely political and involving a complex accommodation of geographic,
historic, economic and social interests,4 redistricting has long been

1. Following the redistricting of Essex County, Massachusetts, in 1812, the BOSTON
WEEKLY MESSENGER, March 6, 1812, printed a map of the district. An artist, noting the

dragon like shape of the district, sketched in a head, claws and wings. When a friend
commented that it looked more like a salamander, the artist replied: "Better call it a
Gerrymander" after Governor Elbridge Gerry who signed the districting bill into law.

ROBERT R. DIXON JR., DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION, REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND
POLITICS 459 (1968); see Appendix A.

2. Every ten years, following the decennial census, the political map of the United

States is redrawn. DAVID BUTLER & BRUCE CAIM, CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING 1 (1992).

The process through which this political map is redrawn is referred to as redistricting and
involves two components: apportionment (the process of deciding how many seats each state
will have) and redistricting (the process whereby boundaries within each state are drawn). Id.
at 17. Each state is initially allocated one seat. The remaining 385 seats are apportioned by
a formula which ranks the state's priority by population. Id. at 19. For detailed formulas
of apportionment, see NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, REAPPORTIONMENT
LAW AND TECHNOLOGY 6-9 (1980). When the number of seats within a particular state has

been determined, the boundaries of any new and old districts must be redrawn so that they
are equally populated. See Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969) (holding that a state
must show substantial evidence of unavoidability of variation in order to allow any deviations
from the "one person, one vote" application of districting).
3. Redistricting laws involve two overlapping rights, "the right of individuals to
associate for the advancement of political beliefs, and the right of qualified voters, regardless
of their political persuasion, to cast votes effectively." Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23,
30 (1968).
4. While apportionment is accomplished through use of a neutral mathematical
formula, as indicated in note 2, redistricting is accomplished via legislative negotiation and
compromise. BUTLER & CALM, supra note 2, at 45. Redistricting committees utilize Census
Bureau reports which reveal the socioeconomic characteristics of each census district or block
level. Id. at 58. These detailed reports contain information about total population, gender,
race, voting age, ethnicity, income, educational level and home ownership. Precinct level
party registration records are also used in redistricting processes. Id; see also Miller v.
Johnson, 115 S.Ct. 2475, 2499-500 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("District lines are
drawn to accommodate a myriad of factors - geographic, economic, historical and political
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6
considered the legislature's responsibility.5 Though the Constitution grants
state legislatures the authority to create political districts, judicial intervention is permitted when the delicate balance between individual liberty and
group interests is upset.7 This imbalance is readily apparent when a
legislature engages in political or racial gerrymandering.'

. . . .9').

5. Courts have traditionally given great deference to the legislature. See Wood v.
Brown, 287 U.S. 1,8 (1932) (holding that the Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction over
redistricting); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946) (holding that "Courts ought not enter
[the] political thicket of redistricting and that Congress has exclusive authority to secure and
ensure fair representation.); South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950) (refusing to exercise equity
powers to govern a state's redistricting process); Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 539
(1978) ("[R]edistricting and reapportioning legislative bodies is a legislative task which the
federal courts should make every effort not to pre-empt"); see also Upham v. Seamon, 456
U.S. 37, 40 (1982) (stating that courts should not substitute their own reapportionment plans
and policies for those chosen by the state). But see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)
(stating that the judiciary has the power to review state apportionment and redistricting
procedures).
6. "Each state shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may
direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and
Representatives to which the state may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator
or Representative, or Person holding and Office of Trust or Profit under the United
States, shall be appointed an Elector." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. "The times places
and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives shall be prescribed
in each state by the legislature thereof: but Congress may at any time by law make
or alter such regulations, except as to the places and choosing of senators."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
The propriety of Article I, Section 8 was long debated by the Constitution's framers.
NATIONAL

CONFERENCE

OF

STATE

LEGISLATURES,

REAPPORTIONMENT

LAW

AND

TECHNOLOGY 1 (1980). Alexander Hamilton argued that the provision was necessary to
preserve the union and that a small group of ambitious men might dissolve the union by
simply refusing to elect representatives. THE FEDERALIST No. 59 (ALEXANDER HAMILTON).
7. Since Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the courts have retained a supervisory
role in redistricting. The Baker Court held that redistricting was ajusticiable issue and thus
courts are authorized to hear equal protection clause challenges to state apportionment
decisions. BUTLER & CAIM, supra note 2, at 27. Many constitutional provisions influence
political districting. For example, the courts have held that a legislature's political motives
may be unconstitutional if its plan works to the long term disadvantage of an identifiable
political group. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 128-32 (1986). Also, "[W]hen there is
proof that a discriminatory purpose ... has been a motivating fact in the [legislature's]
decisions... judicial deference is no longer justified" and therefore, Fourteenth or Fifteenth
Amendment violations may be found. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous.
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977). State legislatures must also comply with the
requirements of Article I, Section 2, of the United States Constitution and the Voting Rights
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994).
8. For purposes of this study, gerrymandering is defined as all "apportionment and
districting arrangements which [intentionally] transmute one party's [or interest's] actual voter
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In Miller v. Johnson,9 the Supreme Court rejected an attempt by the
Georgia State Legislature to draw a political district in a manner substantially motivated by considerations of race. This article discusses the merits of
that decision. Part I provides groundwork for analysis of Miller by offering
a brief description of the evolution of voting rights with an emphasis on
Supreme Court cases heard after the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Part II
"analyzes the Miller decision. Part III rebuts the propositions that Miller is
an abuse of judicial power and inconsistent with precedent. Part III also
asserts that the Miller ruling should have been extended to eliminate
political as well as racial gerrymandering. Part IV briefly discusses Miller's
impact upon affirmative action. The article concludes by asserting that the
Miller decision was necessary to ensure equal representation for all
American citizens, both black and white.

I.

THE EVOLUTION OF MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS

A. MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS: 1800 TO 1960

Prior to the Civil War, only six states granted voting rights to
blacks.'" Immediately upon defeat of the Confederacy, Southern states were
required to amend their constitutions to allow universal male suffrage."
The adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment followed soon thereafter, granting
the "right of citizens of the United States to vote" and promising that the
franchise would not be "denied or abridged ...by any state on account of
race, color, or previous condition of servitude."' 2
strength into the maximum number of legislative seats" at the expense of the other party or

interest. ROBERT R. DIxON JR., DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION, REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW

AND POLITICS 460 (1968). There are three principal methods of gerrymandering districts to
obtain party advantage. First, the gerrymandering party may draw a district so that the
opposing party has far more votes within a single district than it needs to win that district. The
opposing party thereby loses the opportunity to use those favorable excess votes in other
districts. Second, the gerrymandering party may increase the odds of electing its candidate by
infusing the district with favorable voters. Third, the gerrymandering party may increase the
number of his opponent's voters when it has been determined that the opponent's candidate
is likely to lose. ANDREW HACKER, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTE, CONGRESSIONAL
REDISTRICTING 47 (1964).

9. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).

10. BERNARD GROFFMAN ET AL., MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST FOR

VOTING EQUALITY 4 (1992). Black males could vote in Maine, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont, and New York. Black females, as well as white females,
were denied the right to vote in all states. Id.
II. Id. The requirement of suffrage regardless of race was a condition of the Military
Reconstruction Act of 1867. Id.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. While the Fourteenth Amendment granted equal
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Nonetheless, upon the withdrawal of Union troops, Southern states

began gradually implementing a series of measures designed to prevent
blacks from both registering and voting. 3 Apparent acquiescence by the
Supreme Court allowed these techniques to become pervasive. 4 By the
beginning of the Twentieth Century, almost all Southern blacks had been
disenfranchised. 5 Any efforts to mobilize black voters were hindered by
inconsistent rulings by the Supreme Court.' 6 Over the next ninety years,
little or no progress was made for minority voting rights. The Voting

Rights Act of 1965 marked the first significant
step towards securing access
7
to the polls for Southern minorities.

protection of the laws, it only indirectly affected voting rights. The Amendment states that
denial of voting rights will result in proportional reduction of the denying state's representation in Congress. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. This enforcement mechanism has never
been used. GROFFMAN, supra note 10, at 4.
13. GROFFMAN, supranote 10, at 5, 6. "State statutes passed in an effort to discourage
black political participation included such legally sanctioned devices as long residency
requirements and very short registration periods." Id. at 7. Poll taxes, property qualifications
for registration and disenfranchising crimes (offenses believed to be most often committed
by blacks) were instituted. While blacks were required to pass state literacy tests,
"grandfather" clauses operated to exempt illiterate whites from similar tests. In the primarily
Democratic South, Republican candidates were scratched off ballots, voting booths were
closed in heavily Republican areas, Republican votes were stolen from ballot boxes and
police intimidated voters. These numerous and varied techniques reduced the number of
voters by one-half between the years 1877 and 1892. STEVEN R. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS:
VOTING RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH, 1944-1969, 6 (1976).
14. Soon after the adoption of the Enforcement Act of 1870 and the Force Act of 1871
(each intended to provide a means by which the newly adopted Fifteenth Amendment would
be enforced), the Supreme Court declared that in order to secure convictions under these acts,
the accused must have operated under the authority of the state with an intention to discriminate on racial grounds. See United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875); United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875). By requiring proof of both agency and intent, the Court
crippled the efforts of Congress to protect minority voting rights from private and official
interference. Armand Derfner, Racial Discriminationandthe Right to Vote, 26 VANDERBILT
L. REv. 523-584 (1973).
15. PAUL LEWINSON, RACE, CLASS, AND PARTY: A HISTORY OF NEGRO SUFFRAGE
AND WHITE POLITICS IN THE SOUTH

81 (1932).

16. See, e.g., Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (finding an Oklahoma grandfather clause to be unconstitutional); U.S. CONST. amend. IX (1920) (right to vote granted to
females); Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935) (Court declared that all white primaries
are legal); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (declaring all-white primaries are unconstitutional); Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937) (upholding the poll tax); Lassiterv. Northhampton County Bd. of Electors, 360 U.S. 45 (1959) (declaring literacy tests constitutional).
17. GROFFMAN, supra note 10, at 16. The 1957, 1960 and 1964 Civil Rights Acts had
little effect upon black voting rights in the South. Id. at 15. After adoption of the Civil Rights
Acts, the registration of voting age blacks increased 5.2 percent in Alabama, 1 percent in
Louisiana, and .2 percent in Mississippi. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 313
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B. SECURING ACCESS TO VOTING FACILITIES: THE VOTING
RIGHTS ACT OF 1965

The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was drafted to be the "goddamnedest

toughest" voting bill ever written."8 The Act and its later amendments
targeted Southern states that had historically engaged in electoral discrimination and supplemented the protection of the Fifteenth Amendment' 9 by
prohibiting all tests and devices employed as a voting prerequisite.2 0
Sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act had the greatest effect upon
minority voting rights.
Section 2 of the 1965 Act prohibited all standards, practices or
procedures by which a state or political subdivision could "deny or abridge
the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or
color."'2' Section 2 also provides enforcement mechanisms for existing
Constitutional protection.22 The most significant provisions targeted
Southern states with a history of discrimination against minorities.2 3 These
(special' provisions, Sections 4 through 9, were designed to prevent
states
from reviving the subtle discriminatory techniques that had been used in

(1966).
18. Quotation by Lyndon B. Johnson to his Attorney General. HOWELL RAINES, My
SOUL IS RESTED: MOVEMENT DAYS IN THE DEEP SOUTH REMEMBERED 337 (1977).
19. BERNARD GROFFMAN & CHANDLER DAVIDSON, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTE,
CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING 17 (1992). House Debate revealed that the Voting
Rights Act would eliminate the "legal dodges and subterfuges" that had been created to skirt
the Fifteenth Amendment. The act was to be "impervious to all legal trickery and evasion."
Id. at 18.
20. See supranote 13 and accompanying text. Section 4(b) of the 1965 Act determined
that ajurisdiction is subject to the Act's special provisions if: I) the jurisdiction maintained
a test or device as a precondition of registering or voting as of November 1, 1964 and 2) less
than 50 percent of the voting age population was registered to vote on November 1, 1964,
or less than 50 percent of the voting age population voted in the November 1964 presidential
election. If a state as a whole did not meet these criteria, the standard was applied to
individual counties within the state. Later amendments expanded this coverage. See infra
note 27 and accompanying text. GROFFMAN, supra note 10, at 16-17.
21. GROFFMAN, supra note 10, at 16.
22. Section 2 was essentially a reiteration of the Fifteenth Amendment, significant in
part because it provided a means of enforcement. See GROFFMAN, supra note 10, at 16-20
(1992).
23. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 contained both temporary and permanent
provisions. Sections 2 and 3 of the Act were considered permanent in nature and affected
the entire nation. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1965). Special provisions, Sections 4 through 9,
were to be applied to only certain jurisdictions and were to expire in five years. See 42
U.S.C. § 1973 (1965).
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prior years.24 Of these special provisions, Section 5 was the most influential.25

Section 5 of the 1965 Voting Rights Act26 was intended to prevent

both the revival of old and the creation of new obstacles to minority
voting. 2" Section 5 requires that covered jurisdictions approve any change
28
in voting standards, practices or procedures with either the Attorney
29
General or the Federal District Court in the District of Columbia. To
receive approval (also called preclearance), the proposed change in voting
procedure cannot have the intention or effect of "denying or abridging the
'
right to vote on account of race or color." If the Department of Justice
or Attorney General denies preclearance, the state's procedure cannot be
implemented. 3'

These provisions, though denounced as an "uncommon exercise of

political power,"

2

were extremely successful in securing and mobilizing

24. Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act set forth the means by which these historical
offenders would be identified. Seven states fell under the scope of the original formula. The
states initially subject to special provisions were Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi,
South Carolina, Virginia, and parts of North Carolina. GROFFMAN, supra note 10, at 17. In
1970 and 1975, amendments to the Act expanded the coverage of Section 4. The 1970
amendments to the Voting Rights Act extended the coverage of special provisions over those
jurisdictions that maintained a test or device as a precondition of registering or voting and
in which less than 50 percent of the voting age population had registered or voted in the 1968
elections. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1970). In 1975, the scope of Section 4 was further expanded
to encompass those states and counties which contained a substantial language-minority
population and which utilized English-only election materials. The use of English-only
election materials is considered to be "test or device" in districts where more than 5 percent
of the residents are a language minority. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1975).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1965).
26. Id.
27. GROFFMAN, supra note 10, at 17-18 (1992).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1965).
29. Ifthe Attorney General denied preclearance, the change could not be implemented.
However, the state legislatures could appeal the decision of the Attorney General by seeking
declaratory judgment from a District Court in Washington, D.C., that the proposed change
was not discriminatory.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (1982).
31. Id. Though the Attorney General or District Court may recommend district
designs, the states have no duty to follow these recommendations. While states may not draw
district lines which violate Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act by diluting minority voting
strength, they are free to follow "their own assessment of state policy." Richard H. Pildes
and Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting Rights:
Evaluating Election-DistrictAppearancesAfter Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REv. 483, 490
(1993).
32. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 388 U.S. 301 (1966) (approving of the Act and
reasoning that "exceptional conditions can justify legislative measures not otherwise
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black political participation.33 Only two years after the 1965 Voting Rights
Act was passed, more than 500,000 new black voters were registered in
covered jurisdictions.34 Every Southern state and jurisdiction covered by
the Acthad registered at least 50 percent of its black voting age population.3"
C. THE COURT'S FIRST ENCOUNTER WITH VOTE DILUTION

While the Voting Rights Act was working to ensure minority access to
voting facilities, the Supreme Court set out to redress another obstacle to

voting equality: malapportionment.36 Prior to 1964, substantial population
disparities existed between state political districts.37 When districts are
unequally populated, the relative strength of its voters is also unequal.3"
"Since the weight of an individual's vote varies inversely with the size of

the electorate, a single vote in a large district has less value than a vote in
a small one."39 Southern states deliberately placed minorities within large
districts to diminish minority voting strength.40

The opportunity to level

appropriate ....
).
33. See GROFFMAN supra note 10, at 21-23.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 22 (The significance of this number becomes apparent when recalling that
in 1940, only 5 percent of blacks in Southern states were registered to vote).
36. Malapportionment is the creation of political districts with unequal population sizes.
37. Prior to the mid 1960s, the Supreme Court refused to hear apportionment cases.
See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946) (holding that apportionment is a political
question and thus not justiciable). The result was gross disparities in population size of state
districts. The Tennessee legislature had failed to redistrict for over sixty years; disparities
among populations in large and small districts approached the ratio of twenty-three to one.
Disparities in Alabama state districts approached sixteen to one. BUTLER & CAIM, supranote
2, at 29. After the 1960 census, forty-two states contained districts where the vote of a citizen
in a small district was twice the power of the vote of a citizen in a large district. ANDREW
HACKER, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTE, CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTING 3 (1964).
38. BUTLER & CALM, supra note 37, at 2. For example, if the State of Utopia contains
two districts with populations of ten and 100 respectively, the relative strength of voters in
the second district is ten times less than that of voters in the first district. In other words,
if each district elects a single representative, then 10 percent of Utopia's voters would be
electing 50 percent of the state's total representatives.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 67. Democracy rests upon the principle of popular sovereignty. Those
interests desired by the majority are favored over interests with less support. Id. Accurate
calculation of the people's will is dependent upon each individual having an equal voice.
But see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 301 (1964) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("The notion
that representation proportioned to the geographic spread of population is .
'the basic
principle of representative government' is, to put it bluntly, not true.").
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41
the representational playing field arose in the 1964 case Reynolds v. Sims.
Utilizing the Fourteenth Amendment's 42 guarantee of equal protection, the
Reynolds Court held that, "equally weighted votes were not necessarily
equally effective ones"43 since individual voters must vote as a block to
Reynolds held that the potential for inflation or
have political impact."
41 of an individual's vote requires that legislative districts be
dilution
equally populated. 46 By invalidating fourteen state districting plans over
the next two years,4 7 the Supreme Court removed one form of minority

41. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). The Reynolds decision was made possible, in part, by the
Court's earlier ruling in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1964). The Baker Court established
that redistricting was a justiciable issue and recognized the potential for vote dilution that
accompanies unequally populated districts.
42. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State
shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONST. amend. 14, § 1. The central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment is to provide
racial neutrality in governmental decision making. See Miller v. Johnson, 115 S.Ct. 2475,
2482 (1995); see, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida,
379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964); see also Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
43. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 533.

RUSH, DOES REDISTRICTING MAKE A DIFFERENCE 13 (1993).
45. BUTLER & CAIM, supra note 2, at 34. "Ethnic or racial vote dilution may be
44.

MARK E.

defined as a process whereby election laws or practices, either singly or in concert, combine
with systematic bloc voting among an identifiable majority group to diminish or cancel the
voting strength of at least one minority group." GROFFMAN, supra note 10, at 24. A
dilutive technique "reduces the potential effectiveness of a group's strength by limiting its
ability to translate that strength into control of the elected public officials." RICHARD
ENGSTROM, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS:
ACT AND THE VoTE DILUTION ISSUE 17 (1980).

THE VOTING RIGHTS

46. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 560. The tolerance for inequality in Congressional
districting is quite low. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) ("[A]s nearly as
practicable, one man's vote ...[should] be worth as much as another's."); Kirkpatrick v.

Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969) (holding that state legislatures must prove good cause for any
deviation from near perfect equality in political district populations); Karcher v. Daggett, 462
U.S. 725 (1983) (stating that congressional districts should be held to a standard of strict
equality).

The standards for state districting are less strict than for Congressional districts since
Art. I. Sec. 2 of the Constitution does not cover state legislatures. In Gaffney v. Cummings,
412 U.S. 735 (1973), the Court held that in order to allow states to accommodate other
districting goals, population deviations of plus or minus 5 percent were permissible. But see
Brown v. Thomson, 426 U.S. 835 (1983) (upholding a district with a population deviation
of almost 90 percent); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973) (allowing a district population
deviation in excess of 10 percent).
47. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S.
633 (1964); Maryland Comm. v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678

(1964); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964); Lucas v. 44th Colorado Gen. Assembly,
377 U.S. 713 (1964); Meyers v. Thigpen, 378 U.S. 554 (1964); Nolan v. Rhodes, 378 U.S.
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vote dilution and insured that intra-district population equality would
forevermore be a primary districting goal.
D. MORE ELUSIVE FORMS OF VOTE DILUTION: THE RACIAL GERRYMANDER

Having secured access to voting facilities for minority citizens, courts
focused their attention on redressing vote dilution caused by racial
gerrymandering. Unlike malapportionment, racial gerrymandering can dilute
voting strength even in equally populated districts.4" Dilution occurs when
these district are drawn in such a manner as to enhance the voting strength
of some racial or political49 groups while diluting the strength of others.5"
Like racial gerrymandering,"' at-large elections, s2 anti-single-shot laws,"
increasing the size of legislative districts, 4 and changing elected offices to
appointed ones were subtle techniques by which the strength of minority
votes were diminished without directly denying access to voting facilities."
The Voting Rights Act" and Reynolds decision were incapable of prevent-

556 (1964); Williams v. Moss, 378 U.S. 558 (1964); Germano v. Kerner, 378 U.S. 560
(1964); Marshall v. Hare, 378 U.S. 561 (1964); Heam v. Symlie, 378 U.S. 563 (1964);
Pinney v. Batterworth, 378 U.S. 564 (1964); Hill v. Davis, 378 U.S. 565 (1964).
48. HACKER, supranote 37, at 59. Even if an individual has an equally weighted right
to vote, gerrymandering can operate to dilute the value of that vote. See supra note 8 and
accompanying text. The Baker decision dealt with the dilution of individual votes that
resulted from the creation of districts with unequal population sizes.
49. The .Supreme Court has suggested that large political organizations are not as
vulnerable to the effects of gerrymandering as are minority groups. Since they are better able
to cope with the consequences of vote dilution, less protection is offered to those groups
claiming partisan gerrymandering. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986) (stating that
a successful partisan gerrymandering claim is predicated upon a showing by the complainant
that members of the political group suffered discrimination similar to that of racial
minorities); Badham v. Eu, 488 U.S. 1024 (1989) (rejecting the contention that disadvantages
suffered by California Republicans were similar to those of Southern Blacks).
50. BUTLER AND CALM, supra note 2, at 34.
51. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
52. Districts which are at-large, or multi-member, do not utilize traditional district
lines. Black communities which might have constituted a majority within small singlemember districts are thereby overwhelmed by the white majority.
53. Anti-single-shot laws prohibit voting for a single candidate in situations where
there are multiple candidates. GROFFMAN, supranote 10, at 140. These laws prohibited blacks
from withholding votes for all candidates on the ballot except those that they wished to elect.
GROFFMAN & DAVIDSON, supra note 19, at 25.
54. Decreasing the size of legislative bodies decreases overall minority control within
the district. GROFFMAN & DAVIDSON, supra note 19, at 25.
55. GROFFMAN, supra note 10, at 140.
56. Though political redistricting is a "voting procedure" subject to Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act (see Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973)), the 1965, 1970 and
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ing these dilutive techniques since they did not directly deny access to the
vote and could be employed even in equally populated districts. The
Supreme Court, recognizing the need to protect minorities against more
subtle forms of vote dilution, found a solution in the Constitution's
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
The Court first began to address the dilutive effects of gerrymandering
in Gomillian v. Lightfoot.57 In Gomillian, the City of Tuskegee intentionally drew its political district to exclude almost all Negro citizens from the
city.58 The Gomillian Court invalidated the district on grounds that it
violated the Fifteenth Amendment by denying Tuskegee's Negro residents
the right to participate in municipal elections.59 Though the City's gerrymander was more akin to vote denial than vote dilution, Justice Frankfurter's opinion shed light and public attention on the subtle and sophisticated
means by which gerrymandering could affect voting strength.6 ° The
Supreme Court finally invalidated vote dilution in Fortson v. Dorsey.6 In
Fortson,the Court held that multi-member districts are inherently unconstitutional if they "designedly or otherwise ... operate to minimize or cancel
out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting
population."62
In Whitcomb v. Chavis,03 the Court suggested that vote dilution could
be proven by showing that a cohesive and politically salient group had "less
opportunity than did other.., residents to participate in the political process
and to elect legislators of their choice."64 This lost opportunity was to be
measured by the "totality of the circumstances" and included consideration
of such factors as: 1) lack of access to the process of slating candidates, 2)
unresponsiveness of legislators to particularized interests, 3) past discrimination which precludes effective participation, 4) existence of large districts,

1975 Amendments were limited in coverage and focused upon lifting barriers to minority
voting access, not the protection of voting strength.
57. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
58. The effect of the redistricting was to remove from the city all but four or five of
Tuskegee's 400 Negro voters. Not a single white voter was displaced by the redistricting.
Id. at 341. See Appendix B.

59. Id. at 345.
60. GROFFMAN & DAVIDSON, supra note 19, at 30. Foreshadowing Shaw v. Reno, 113
S. Ct. 2816 (1993), and Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995), Justice Whittaker, in
concurrence, held that the Fourteenth Amendment would have been a more appropriate
remedy. Gomillian, 364 U.S. at 349 (Whittaker, J., concurring).
61. 379 U.S. 433 (1965).
62. Id. at 439.
63. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
64. Id. at 149.
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5) majority. vote requirements, 6) anti-single-shot laws, and 7) prohibiting
at-large candidates from running in geographic subunits. 65 The 1986 case
Thornburg v. Gingles66 added the requirement that minority complainants
demonstrate: 1) group voting behavior, and 2) racially polarized voting by
the majority which, over time, defeats the preferred candidate of the
minority community.67 Though initially concerned with preventing the
dilution of minority voting strength, the Court soon recognized that the
racial gerrymander could strike both blacks and whites alike.
In United Jewish Organizationsv. United States ("UJO"), 6 members
of a Jewish community alleged that a New York redistricting plan,
formulated to meet the requirements of the Voting Rights Act, had divided
their community in half and thus violated the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendment's prohibition against vote dilution. 69 The UJO Court denied
7
the plaintiffs claim, 70 holding that considerations of race are permissible '
and often necessary to comply with Sections 4 and 5 of the Voting Rights
Act.72 Significantly, however, the Court held that racial considerations
65. It was actually the Fifth Circuit case of Zimmerman v. McKeithern, 485 F.2d 1297
(1973), that proposed analysis of the previous seven factors. Though not a Supreme Court
case, the factors in Zimmerman were universally used by courts. GROFFMAN & DAVIDSON,
supra note 19, at 34.
66. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
67. Id. at 50, 56. The individuals which comprise voting blocks do not always
faithfully adhere to the group's voting patterns, deviating from the group by voting for the
opposite coalition or interest. DIXON, supra note 8, at 437-3 8. The Whitcomb and Zimmer

tests where insufficient because even if a voting group was numerous, compact and cohesive,
there was still no guarantee that all individual members of the group would act in unison.
By requiring minority plaintiffs to show group voting behavior, the Thornburg Court supplied
a means by which the cohesiveness of group behavior could be proven.
68. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
69. Having been once denied preclearance by the Department of Justice, the N.Y.
legislature, in order to attain a nonwhite majority of 65 percent, which it felt necessary to
meet Department of Justice preclearance standards, split the petitioner's community between
two separate districts. Id. at 152.
70. The Court classified the Jewish residents as whites and concluded that the New
York plan did not violate the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, since "whites would not
be under-represented relative to their share of the population." Id. at 166. The Court further
held that the use of racial criterion was justified to the extent that "[t]he percentage of
districts with a nonwhite majority roughly approximates the percentage of nonwhites in the
county." Id. at 165.
71 . The UJO plurality appeared to allow ameliorative uses of redistricting. The Court
held that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments are not violated by the use of specific
numerical quotas establishing majority-minority districts. Id. at 162. Further, the Court held
that the deliberate use of race to increase under represented minorities caused "no racial slur
or stigma with respect to whites or any other race . . . ." Id. at 165.
72. Id. at 159. See also Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976) (implying that the
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which result in unfair representation, fence out white populations, or unfairly
cancel out white voting strength, would violate the Equal Protection
Clause.73
In 1982, Congress provided its own remedy for vote dilution74 by
amending the Voting Rights Act. 7' The 1982 amendments required that

legislators be race conscious when drawing district lines by prohibiting any

redistricting plan which diminished the voting strength of an individual
based upon his race or color.76 Since the 1982 amendments, individuals
claiming dilution have had two alternatives: a claim under the Voting
Rights Act or a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Voting Rights

Constitution does not prevent a state subject to the Voting Rights Act from deliberately
creating or preserving black majorities in particular districts in order to ensure that its
reapportionment plan complies with Sec. 5); City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S.
358 (1995).
73. Here, the Equal Protection Clause was used to ensure equal representation. But
see Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
74. In the eyes of civil rights activists, progress towards voting equality took a major
step backwards in City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). The Bolden plurality held
that racial discrimination was a prerequisite to a vote dilution claim. Id. at 66. The Court's
opinion in Bolden is completely inconsistent with its precedent concerning the Fourteenth
Amendment claims. In Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1979), the Court established that
a showing of intent to discriminate was a prerequisite to a Fourteenth Amendment claim.
The Court held that discriminatory impact was insufficient to state a cause of action. Id. at
239-40. Though the decision had little effect upon suits brought under the Voting Rights
Act, since those Acts did not prevent vote dilution, it made Fourteenth Amendment vote
dilution claims much more difficult to prove. Fearing that the Bolden standards were too
strict, civil rights activists heavily lobbied Congress to amend the Voting Rights Act so that
a showing of intent, as required by Bolden, would no longer be required. The activists
advocated the "results tests" that was later incorporated into section 2. GROFFMAN, supra
note 10, at 39.
75. Remember that the 1965, 1970 and 1975 Voting Rights Acts only protected
minority access to the vote. Any claims of dilution of voting strength came under the Court's
Fourteenth Amendment formula which required a showing of intent.
76. Section 2 was changed to read in part:
(A) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any state of political subdivision in a
manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the
United States to vote on account of race or color ....

(B) A violation of subsection (a) occurs if, based upon the totality of the
circumstances, it is shown that the political process leading to the nomination or
election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation
by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in that its members
have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the
political process and elect representatives of their choice ....
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Act is less burdensome upon plaintiffs since a showing of discriminatory
intent is not necessary.77
E. ILLEGAL CLASSIFICATIONS

In its landmark decision Shaw v. Reno,7" the Supreme Court forged

a completely new weapon to ensure voting equality: a prohibition against
racial classifications.7 9 In an attempt to comply with the new vote dilution
provisions of the 1982 Voting Rights Act, the North Carolina legislature
redrew its political map to include two majority-black districts.8 0 Residents
in one of the majority-black districts filed suit contending that the state had
created an unconstitutional racial gerrymander.8 ' The Supreme Court
agreed and held that the North Carolina districting scheme unjustifiably
segregated voters into different districts based solely upon their race. 2 The
Supreme Court began its analysis by distinguishing equal protection claims
from vote dilution claims.

77. S. Rep. No. 97-417, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1982). A Senate Judiciary Report
accompanying the Amendment stated that "this amendment is designed to make clear that
proof of discriminatory intent is not required to establish a violation of Section 2. It thereby
restores the legal standards based upon the controlling Supreme Court precedents ... prior
to Mobile v. Bolden." Id. at 2.
78. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
79. While the Supreme Court had never utilized the Equal Protection Clause's
prohibition against racial classification, the idea was certainly not new. As early as 1960, it
had been suggested that the Equal Protection Clause should be utilized in cases of racial
gerrymander. See Gomillian v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (Whitaker, J., concurring).
80. The impetus for the change was the 1990 census which entitled North Carolina to
an additional legislative seat. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 630. At the time, forty counties with the state
were covered by the Voting Rights Act which required that redistricting plans be approved
by either the Attorney General or by a district court in the District of Columbia. After its first
redistricting plan, which included one majority-black district, was rejected by the Attorney
General, the North Carolina legislature submitted a plan containing two majority black
districts. One of those districts was extremely irregular in shape. Its length was approximately
160 miles long and, in some places, no wider than an interstate highway. Id. at 635. The
district split towns and counties and appeared to have no respect for traditional districting
principles. Id. In remarking on its peculiar shape, one legislator noted, "if you drove down
the interstate with both car doors open, you'd kill most of the people in the district." Id. at
636. The Attorney General precleared the plan. Id.
81. The appellants contended that the majority black district had been created without
regard for traditional districting considerations such as compactness, contiguity, geographical
boundaries, or political subdivisions. Id. at 630. Appellants also contend that the shape of the
district was so irregular that it "rationally [could] only be viewed as an effort to segregate
voters on the basis of race for purposes of voting." Id; see Appendix C (map reprinted from
Supreme Court Reporter with permission of West Publishing Company).
82. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 630.
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UJO was a vote dilution case; Shaw was not. Unlike UJO, the

districting scheme in Shaw was "so irrational on its face that it immediately

offended principles of racial equality."83 The Shaw appellants claimed that
the district plan "on its face was so highly irregular that it rationally could
be understood only as an effort to segregate voters by race." 4 The Shaw
Court held that racial classifications are odious in their very nature to
institutions founded upon equality"5 and thus threaten harms distinct from
those of vote dilution.86 Among these distinct harms are the potential to

"stigmatize individuals by reason of their membership in a racial group"87
and racial hostility.88 Shaw reasoned that these, along with other "special

harms,"89 necessitate an exacting judicial examination of districts whose
shape is so bizarre that they could only have been based upon racial

considerations. In absence of legitimate considerations" which might

explain the district's bizarre shape, 9 the Court held that North Carolina's
two-district scheme should be subjected to strict scrutiny. This exacting
standard is only satisfied if the State legislature can show that92 its plan is
narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest.
By invalidating redistricting schemes based solely upon race, Shaw
established a new cause of action entirely independent of dilutive effect. 93
The Shaw Court did not, however, appear to bar all intentional, race

83. Id. at 652.
84. Id. at 651.

85. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1948).
86. Id.
87. Classifications based solely upon race threaten to "stigmatize individuals by reason
of their membership in a racial group" and are likely to invite racial hostility. See Shaw, 509
U.S. at 643; City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 448 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
88. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 643.
89. The Court held that racial voting classifications create and reinforce the idea that
members of the same racial group think alike and share identical political interests. Such
classifications disregard age, education, economic status or community factors. Id. at 647.
Further, the Court held that when districts are created to effectuate a "perceived common
interest . . . elected officials are more likely to believe that their primary obligation is to
represent only the members of that group" rather than the entire constituency. Id.
90. The Court cites compactness, contiguity and respect for political subdivisions.
Shaw, 509 U.S. at 630.
91. The Court repeatedly notes that though these factors are sufficient to rebut a claim
that a district is drawn solely upon the race of its occupants, the legislature does not mandate
consideration of these factors. Id. at 630, 652, 656, and 676.
92. Id. at 630.
93. The Court's opinion in Shaw is both muddled and confused. Seeming inconsistencies created more questions than the decision answered. See infra notes 183, 184 and
accompanying text.
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conscious districting. 94 The Court explicitly declined to rule on whether or
how "mixed motive" 95 districts could be challenged and also left undecided
whether "the intentional creation of minority-majority districts, without
more, always gives rise to an Equal Protection violation. 9 6 Thus, Shaw
appears to have created two distinct gerrymanders:
constitutionally
impermissible gerrymanders which cannot be explained on grounds other
than race, and legitimate gerrymanders in which race was a factor but not
the sole motivating factor.97 While wounding the racial gerrymander,
Shaw did not destroy it. The coup de grace was to come one year later in
Miller v. Johnson.9"

II. MILLER V. JOHNSON
A. FACTS.

As a result of the 1980 Decennial Census, the state of Georgia occupied

ten seats in the United States House of Representatives;99 one of those

seats was majority-black.' 0 Due to population increases reported by the
1990 Decennial Census, Georgia was allowed an eleventh legislative
seat' 0 ' and in 1991 began the task of redistricting. Among the factors
considered by the General Assembly while redrawing district lines were
equality of population among districts, 02 contiguous geography,'0 3 fidelity
94. The Court suggested several times that race-conscious redistricting is not
necessarily a trigger for strict scrutiny, and may often be necessary for compliance with the
Voting Rights Act. "Appellants appear to concede that race-conscious redistricting is not
always unconstitutional. That concession is wise. This Court has never held that raceconscious state decision making is impermissible in all circumstances." Shaw, 509 U.S. at
642. But see Shaw, 509 U.S. at 649 ("Thus we express no view as to whether the intentional
creation of majority-minority districts, without more, always gives rise to an Equal Protection
claim").
95. "Mixed motive" is the author's own term of art used to mean districts drawn
intentionally upon race but that also include non-racial districting factors.
96. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 643.

97. Richard H. Plides and Richard G. Niemi, ExpressiveHarms, "BizarreDistricts,"
and Voting Rights: EvaluatingElectionDistrictAppearancesAfter
Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH.

L. REv. 499 (1993).

98. Miller v. Johns~n, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 2483.
Id.
Id.
See notes 36-48 and accompanying text.
Courts have held contiguous to mean that "all parts of the district are joined

together." GROFFMAN, supranote 10, at 64 (1992). Also known as geographic compactness
(see Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986)), the question of contiguity addresses a
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to precinct lines where possible' 4 and maintenance of minority voting
strength via compliance with Sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act. 105
In addition to plans proposed by its legislators, the Georgia General
Assembly welcomed the submission of plans authored by its citizens.00 67
One such plan was submitted by the American Civil Liberties Union.1
The ACLU's plan, referred to as the Max-Black plan,'0 " was intended to
maximize black voting strength0 9 by combining and condensing statewide
black populations into three of Georgia's eleven available districts." 0
While the Georgia General Assembly began formulating its districting plan,
the ACLU relentlessly lobbied the Department of Justice to require adoption
of the Max-Black plan."'
Pursuant to the requirements of Section 5, the Georgia General
Assembly submitted its redistricting plan to the Department of Justice for
preclearance." 2 The General Assembly's plan doubled the number of
majority-black districts and created a third district in which blacks
comprised an influential but sub-majority percentage of the voting age

district's shape. "A proposed district is sufficiently compact if it retains a natural sense of
community.., a district should not be so convoluted that its representatives could not easily
tell who lives within the district .. " East Jefferson Coalition for Leadership and Dev. v.
Parish of Jefferson, 691 F. Supp. 991, 1007 (1988).
104. Consideration of these and other factors were part of a voluntary effort by the
Georgia General Assembly to clarify its districting process. Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp.
1354, 1360 (1994), aff'd, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995). Consideration of these factors was not
required by law or statute.
105. The State of Georgia is covered by the special provisions of the Voting Rights Act.
Thus, all changes in voting procedure or practice require Department of Justice approval. See
supra notes 18-35 and accompanying text.
106. Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1360 (1994), aff'd, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
107. The plan, nicknamed the Max-Black plan, was submitted by Kathleen Wilde, an
attorney for the American Civil Liberties Union in her capacity as the advocate for the Black
Caucus of the Georgia General Assembly. Id. at 1360.
108. Id. at 1360, 1361, 1363.
109. Floor debate and depositions leave no doubt that traditional districting factors were
abandoned in the ACLU's attempt to maximize black voting strength. Representative Tyrone
Brooks, a member of the Georgia Black Caucus, stated that in formulating the Max-Black
plan its drafters were "not concerned about anything other than maximizing our voting
strength." Id. at 1361.
110. Id. See Appendix D (map reprinted from Supreme Court Reporter with permission
from West Publishing Company).
11. The Department of Justice is the agency responsible for preclearing the General
Assembly's redistricting plan under 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1995). See infra notes 120, 121 and
accompanying text.
112. See notes 18-35 and accompanying text.
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public." 3 Submitting to pressure from the ACLU," 4 the Department of
Justice denied preclearance, noting concern that the Georgia Legislature had
not yet completely maximized black voting potential.' Undaunted by the
rejection of its first redistricting plan, the Georgia General Assembly began
anew. 116
The Legislature's second plan more closely conformed to the suggestions of the Department of Justice and not coincidentally," 7 the MaxBlack plan advocated by the ACLU. Splitting counties to recognize
additional black populations, the revised plan increased minority voter
strength in Georgia's Second District by ten percent.'
While extending
black voting power far beyond that of its first districting plan, the Legislature refused to hyper-extend particular districts, as suggested by the MaxBlack plan, reasoning that the extensions would dissect media markets and
"violate all reasonable standards of compactness and contiguity.""' 9
Puppet to the ACLU, 20 the Department of Justice rejected the Legislature's second redistricting plan.
In its third attempt at preclearance, the Georgia legislature used the
ACLU's Max-Black plan as its benchmark.' 2 ' Drafters of the third plan
113. Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1363 (S.D. Ga. 1994), aff'd, 115 S. Ct.
2475 (1995).
114. Id. After the first redistricting plan was submitted, the ACLU accused the Georgia
legislature of ignoring the Max-Black plan and pressured the Department of Justice to refuse
preclearance. Id. See infra notes 120, 121 and accompanying text.
115. Recall that before redistricting, Georgia only had one majority-black district. Thus,
even after more than doubling the number of majority-black districts, the Department of
Justice - or perhaps more appropriately the ACLU - was still unsatisfied.
116. Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1364 (S.D. Ga. 1994), aff'd, 115 S. Ct. 2475
(1995).
117. See infra notes 120, 121 and accompanying text.
118. Black voting strength in the Second District was increased to 45.01 percent. Id. In
the Fifth and Eleventh Districts, blacks comprised almost 60 percent of the voting age
population. Id. at 1364-66.
119. Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1365 (S.D. Ga. 1994), aff'd, 115 S. Ct. 2475
(1995).
120. The ACLU had a profound influence upon the Department of Justice. The District
Court revealed that the ACLU and Department of Justice were in close cooperation with one
another during the General Assembly's districting debates. Id. at 1361. The District Court
was abhorred by the use of "informants," "whistleblowers" and "secret agents" by the
Department of Justice and ACLU throughout the General Assembly's redistricting debates
and labeled the collusion between the two groups "an embarrassment." Id. at 1367.
121. Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2484 (1995). Commenting upon the collusion
between the ACLU and the Department of Justice, the Miller Court stated, "[t]hough the
Department of Justice denied that the Max-Black plan was the 'benchmark' against which
Georgia's efforts were compared, its role as such soon became obvious to the General
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openly confessed that "[getting] the numbers" was their primary concern.' 22 The result was the creation of three majority-black. districts.'2 3
Having finally bent under the relentless pressure of the ACLU, the Georgia
General Assembly submitted its distorted districts 2 4 to the Department of
Justice. Preclearance was granted. 2 ' Elections in the new districts were
held in November of 1992.26 Black candidates were elected from all three
filed suit alleging that
majority-minority districts. 2 7 Five white voters
21
gerrymander.
racial
a
was
the Eleventh District
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The cornerstone of the district court's'29 analysis was the premise that
racial classifications are presumptively invalid and only acceptable upon
Relying heavily upon Shaw v. Reno, the
extraordinary justification.'
constitutes: a showing that the
justification
extraordinary
that
ruled
court
law is narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest.13 Noting
that discriminatory intent is an "indispensable element" of successful
discrimination claim,' the district court sided with those interpretations
Assembly, and is [equally] obvious to this Court." Id. at 1364.
122. Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1366 (S.D. Ga. 1994), aff'd, 115 S. Ct.
2475 (1995).
123. The Second District, with 52.33 percent black voting age, the Fifth District, with
57.47 percent, and the Eleventh District, with 60.36 percent. Id. at 1366.
124. "The populations of the Eleventh District are centered around four discrete, widely
spaced urban centers that have absolutely nothing to do with each other, and stretch the
district hundreds of miles across rural counties and narrow swamp corridors." Johnson v.
Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1366 (S.D. Ga. 1994), aff'd, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995). Extending
from Atlanta to the Atlantic Ocean, the Eleventh District split eight counties and five
municipalities. Id.
125. Id.
126. Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1369 (S.D. Ga. 1994), aftd, 115 S. Ct.
2475 (1995).
127. Id.
128. Id. Before reaching the District Court for the Southern District of Georgia,
plaintiffs faced a challenge that they lacked standing to sue. These claims were addressed
in United States v. Hays, 115 S. Ct. 2431 (1995), where it was ultimately determined that all
plaintiffs had standing. Id.
129. Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354 (S.D. Ga. 1994), aff'd, 115 S. Ct. 2475
(1995).
130. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
131. See Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2832 (1992); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S.
429, 432 (1984); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 491 (1980) (racial classification is
subject to "the most searching examination").
132. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976). The Washington Court held that
the essential purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was the prevention of official acts
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of Shaw which held that the bizarre .shape of a political district, while
constituting circumstantial evidence of legislative intent, is not a threshold
inquiry.'33 The court reasoned that while an oddly shaped political district
may be a "smoking gun" which reveals racially discriminatory intent,
requiring bizarre shape as a prerequisite to an Equal Protection claim'34
would be contrary to Shaw's intent.13 The district court concluded that
when race is "the substantial or motivating consideration in the creation of
the district"'3 6 regardless of district shape, invocation of strict scrutiny is
appropriate.
The Shaw court had explicitly refused to rule on the issue of whether,
when considered with other districting goals, consideration of race might
violate Equal Protection.'3 7 The district court justified its interpretation
of Shaw by reviewing other district court decisions.3 . and Fourteenth
resulting in race discrimination. To constitute a violation of Equal Protection, a showing of
discriminatory purpose or intent is necessary. Under Washington,official action will not be
held unconstitutional solely because it results in racially disproportionate impact.
133. Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1369 (S.D. Ga. 1994), aff'd, 115 S. Ct.
2475 (1995). Under Shaw, the district's shape is "objective" evidence of legislative intent
to discriminate on racial grounds. While discriminatory intent is necessary for an Equal
Protection claim, "the Court does not assess, on first principles, whether the district looks
bizarre." Johnson, 864 F. Supp. at 1370; see also Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408, 431
(E.D.N.C. 1994) (the requisite level of proof can be made "by any means, including state
concession, bizarre shape, or some combination of the various factors typically used to prove
the intent element of an Equal Protection claim").
134. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
135. The majority held that the purpose of analyzing a district's shape is to glean the
intent of the legislature by working backwards. 864 F. Supp. at 1374. The Supreme Court
adopted this approach in Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 631-53 (1981). Though intent is
still required, "foreclosing production of 'direct' evidence of intent until Plaintiffs convince
the Court that a district looks so weird that race must have dominated its creation is not what
Shaw intended." Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1374 (S.D. Ga. 1994), aff'd, 115 S.
Ct. 2475 (1995).
136. The Court held that the proper interpretation of Shaw's race-based requirement is
that, in order to invoke strict scrutiny, it must be shown that race was the substantial or
motivating consideration in creation of the district. This requires a showing that 1) the
legislature was consciously influenced by race, and 2) race was the overriding, predominant
force determining the lines of the district. Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354 (S.D. Ga.
1994), aftd, 115 S.Ct. 2475 (1995).
137. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1992).
138. The district court notes two levels of racial motivation recognized by courts after
Shaw. First, some district courts since Shaw have held that race must be the sole motivation
behind a districts shape in order to invoke strict scrutiny. See Bridgeport Coalition v. City
of Bridgeport, 26 F.3d 271 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding that a lower court did not transgress Shaw
because it did not instruct the city counsel to redistrict solely on racial grounds). Second,
some decisions hold that race need only be a recognizable factor, not the sole or determining
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Amendment Supreme Court rulings.'3 9 The Department of Justice appealed, claiming that Shaw required a showing of bizarre shape as a
prerequisite to an Equal Protection claim.
C. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION

The Miller decision represented the Court's second attempt to cut a
4 ° Due to the
clear path through the "political thicket" of redistricting.
4
variety of interpretations which had arisen from the Shaw ' decision,
Miller was necessary to clarify and review the parameters of the Fourteenth
Amendment's prohibition against racial classifications. The Court began its
opinion by clearly announcing the prima facie elements of a racial
gerrymandering claim and later focused on distinguishing the permissible
from impermissible uses of racial data in legislative redistricting decisions.
Justice Kennedy led the Miller majority.
Ruling 5-4, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's interpretation of Shaw.'42 Laying the foundation for its opinion, the Court reaffirmed the long held proposition'43 that the Fourteenth Amendment
144
requires complete racial neutrality in government decision making. The
Court noted that racial classifications prevalent in the 1950s and 1960s
violated this principle of neutrality,1 45 causing feelings of inferiority
46 Since, racial
among minorities and perpetuating racial stereotypes.'
classifications are dangerously antithetic to the Fourteenth Amendment, they
one, before it is constitutionally suspect. See Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F. Supp. 1188, 1202,
1214 (W.D. La. 1993).
139. Prior to Johnson v. Miller,the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment
is violated when race is a "substantial or motivating factor" in legislative decision making.
See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66
(1977); City Schl. Dist. Bd. of Educ. y. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977). Several Supreme
Court cases have held that the intent requirement applies to voting cases. See e.g., Rogers v.
Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982); Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 2825-27 (reviewing Guinn v.
United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915)); Gomillian v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Wright
v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964).
140. See Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2856 (1993).
141. Id.
142. Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
143. Id. at 2482 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
144. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2482.
145. Id. (citing New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54
(1958); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956); Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955);
Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954).
146. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2486.
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"call for the most exacting judicial examination."' 47 Reasoning that racial
classifications in the voting context were no less harmful, Kennedy noted
that racial gerrymanders "balkanize [citizens] into competing racial factions"
and perpetuate the stereotypical assumption that "because of their race,
[minorities] 'think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer
the same candidate at the polls."" 48 The Court reasoned that the harms
inherent in race-based redistricting justify judicial intervention and
application of traditional Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny.'49 To initiate
this scrutiny, the Court required that complainants prove "that race was the
predominant factor motivating the legislature's decision to place a significant
number of voters [inside] or [outside] a particular district."'' 0 Kennedy
justified this heavy burden for plaintiffs by noting that legislative redistricting decisions are accompanied by a presumption of good faith'' and
further admonished courts to use "extraordinary caution"' 2 when analyzing a state's "intensely political" redistricting schemes.' 53
The Court noted that proving a substantial motivation to racially
gerrymander is significantly complicated by the many permissible uses of
racial demographic data.5 4 When redrawing district lines, a state is free
to recognize communities comprised predominantly of one race, as long as
those communities share "some common thread of relevant interests.' 5 5
Shared political, social and economic interests are legitimate considerations
and thus may justify the concentration of a minority group inside or outside
a political district.' 56 The Court also noted that awareness of race is
entirely distinct from reliance upon race.'5 7 With a wealth of demographic
information at their fingertips, legislators are always aware of a community's racial composition. Thus, Kennedy ruled that a successful racial
gerrymander claim requires proof that the legislature acted "because of' a
community's racial composition, and not just "in spite of' that racial

147. Id. at 2482 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291

(1978)).

148. Id. at 2486 (citing Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993)).

149. Id. at 2487.
150. Id. at 2488.

151. Id.
152. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2488.

153. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2486.
154. Id. at 2488-90.
155. Id. at 2490.

156. Id.

157. Id. at 2487.
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composition.' 58 The Court revealed several means by which plaintiffs
might make this distinction.
Relying upon principles first promulgated in Shaw, Kennedy reaffirmed
that a district's bizarre shape may be convincing circumstantial evidence of
racial gerrymandering since "in some exceptional cases, a reapportionment
plan may be so highly irregular, that on its face' 59 it cannot be understood
as anything other than a racial classification."' 60 While a district's shape
may be sufficient proof that traditional districting principles were subordinated to considerations of race, the Court stressed that bizarre shape is not
a prima facie requirement. 6 '
Kennedy also indicated that legislative statements which indicate an
intent to gerrymander or the subordination of traditional race-neutral
districting factors constitutes "powerful evidence" of discriminatory
intent.1 62 Utilizing this second- approach, the Miller Court ruled that the
statements and admissions of Georgia's legislators were overwhelming
evidence of an intent to gerrymander.' 63 Thus, Miller held that in addition
to circumstantial evidence of a district's bizarre shape, any direct evidence
illustrating an overriding motive or desire to assign citizens to a legislative
64
district based upon their race is sufficient to invoke strict scrutiny.
The Miller Court did not eliminate all racial gerrymandering, noting
that substantial reliance upon racial data may be permissible when used as
a remedial measure. 65 Citing traditional affirmative action precedent, and
noting the state's strong interest in eradicating discrimination, the Court
sanctioned the limited use of racial gerrymanders 66 , to ameliorate the
effects of past discrimination. Paradoxically, however, Kennedy held that
even remedial gerrymanders would immediately be subject to strict
scrutiny.' 67 Reminding legislators that compelling evidence is required to
justify remedial districts, 6 1 the Court ruled that Georgia's redistricting
158. Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2488 (1995) (citing Personnel Adm'r of Mass.
v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,279 (1979) (proof of discriminatory purpose requires a showing that
the decision maker chose a "particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' and not
merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects....
159. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2485.

160. Id.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. at 2486.
Id. at 2490.
Id.
Id. at 2485.
Id. at 2490.
Id.
Miller, 113 S. Ct. at 2490.
Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2490 (1995) (citing Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct.
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could not be classified as remedial since it was not reasonably necessary to
prevent dilution of minority voting strength. The Court did not address
whether compliance with the Voting Rights Act, without more, could
69
constitute a compelling interest.
III. ANALYSIS
Critics denounce the Miller decision as an unprecedented trespass into
legislative territory. 70 Quite to the contrary, Miller is a logical extension
of Equal Protection principles set forth in Shaw v. Reno. 7 ' Part A of this
section rebuts the claim that the Miller decision will lead to repeated
intrusions into redistricting processes and illustrates the absurdity of the
appellant's argument that the Court's prior decision in Shaw required a
showing of bizarre shape. Part B of this section asserts that Miller should
have been extended to prohibit political as well as racial gerrymandering.
The final section of the Article discusses potential impacts stemming from
the Miller decision with particular emphasis on how minority representation
will be affected.
A. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S DECISION

To defend Miller it is first necessary to rebut the argument that the
Court trespassed into what has traditionally been legislative territory.' 72
Undeniably, federal courts must exercise extreme caution when evaluating
racial gerrymandering claims.' Redistricting is a legislative function and for good reason. First, it is the legislature, not the judiciary, that is
armed with a fantastic array of socioeconomic census information; 74
courts lack both the experience and training necessary to assimilate and
utilize this data. Second, state legislators, not court justices, are most closely

2637, 2642 (1993)).
169. Id.
170. Justices Stevens and Ginsburg note, as do principal critics, that the majority in
Miller expanded the judicial role by allowing review of any district predominantly motivated
by race, while the Court's decision in Shaw allowed judicial review only for apportionments
resulting in extremely irregular shapes. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2499-2501 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
171. Shaw, 113 S.Ct. 2816 (1993).
172. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
173. Justice Kennedy unabashedly warned lower courts to use great caution in
adjudicating claims of racial gerrymandering and called federal review of redistricting "a
serious intrusion on to the most vital of local functions." Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475,
2488 (1995) (citing Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27 (1975)).
174. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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related to the general electorate and are thus best able to recognize and
convey the needs of voters and local communities of interest. Third, and
most importantly, the Constitution grants the legislature exclusive power to
regulate "the times, places and manner of holding elections for senators and
representatives." ' These arguments would seem to weigh against judicial
review and, consequently the Miller decision. However, by imposing heavy
prima facie burdens and maintaining the presumption that legislative districts
are drawn in good faith, the Miller Court minimized the threat of excessive
judicial interference.
To survive summary judgment, plaintiffs must overcome the presumption of good faith which accompanies all legislative actions.' 7 6 This
requires that plaintiffs first ascertain whether the legislature considered race
when drawing district lines, and then offer direct or circumstantial evidence
that race was the predominant and motivating factor.'77 Since the legislature may rebut this claim by offering evidence that other districting factors
were more important than race,'78 plaintiffs must be intimately familiar
with all redistricting factors, as well as the extent to which each factor
influenced the overall redistricting process. This burden is monumental. The
intricacy and esoteric nature of political districting will undoubtedly deter
all but the most experienced attorneys and well funded plaintiffs.
Politicians who have tediously drawn district lines to preserve
incumbency advantage are not likely to offer assistance to plaintiffs trying
to invalidate those districts. In absence of bizarre shape' 79 or legislative
confessions of discriminatory intent,80 plaintiffs' attorneys will be hardpressed to satisfy the threshold requirements established by the MillerCourt.
The high prima facie burden imposed upon plaintiffs, the legislature's
interest in preserving district lines, and the Court's cautious nature and

175. U.S. CONST. art. I, §4. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
176. Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2488 (1995) (citing Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318-19 (1978)).
177. Miller, 115 S.Ct. at 2488.
178. Id.
179. Remember that a district's shape, in and of itself, may be sufficient to state a claim
of racial gerrymandering if the district's shape cannot "rationally be understood as anything
other than an effort to 'segregate ...voters' on the basis of race." Miller v. Johnson, 115
S. Ct. 2475, 2485 (citing Shaw v. Reno, 113 S.Ct. 2816 (1993)). Even so, the legislature
may contradict this showing by proving that use of traditional districting procedures, and not
race, was the predominant and motivating reason for the district's shape. See supranotes 8398 and accompanying text.
180. Legislative statements, by themselves, constitute "powerful evidence that the
legislature subordinated traditional districting procedures to race." Miller v. Johnson, 115 S.
Ct. 2475, 2490 (1995). See supra notes 145-178 and accompanying text.
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distaste for judicial review of political questions', make regular court
intrusions into the districting process highly unlikely.
Critics also allege that Miller is a needless deviation from Shaw v. Reno
which had clearly established bizarre shape as a prerequisite to a gerrymandering claim. While Shaw's "muddled language" ' 2 might support such an
argument, simple logic does not. The ACLU openly admitted that its goal
was to "maximize [black] voting strength"'83 by pushing the percentage
of black voters within the district "as high as possible."18 4 Even state
officials admitted that the Max-Black plan "violate[d] all reasonable
standards of compactness and contiguity."' 85 As the the Miller Court
noted, these statements were veritable "stipulation[s]" of discriminatory
intent.' 86 Requiring that plaintiffs look for evidence of bizarre shape in the
face of such admissions is tantamount to searching for an elephant with a
magnifying glass. Further, interpreting Shaw to require a showing of bizarre
shape would, in effect, carve out a distinct Fourteenth Amendment standard
for voting classifications.' 87 No evidence in Shaw supports such an
exception; in fact, Shaw's reliance upon traditional equal protection analysis
clearly precludes such a conclusion.' 88 Thus, the Appellant's argument
181. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
182. Jeffrey Rosen, The ColorBlind Court; ConservativeUnited StatesSupreme Court,
THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 31, 1995, at 19. Justice O'Connor unwittingly built the Shaw
opinion upon precedent that approved of intentional creation of majority-minority districts.
Though taking considerable time to distinguish the vote dilution claim in UJO from the
classification claim in Shaw, O'Connor never directly contradicted the fundamental tenants
of UJO that justified "use of racial criteria not confined to eliminating the effects of past
discriminatory districting." UJO, 430 U.S. at 161. This apparent oversight caused confusion
among district courts. See DeWitt v. Wilson, 865 F. Supp. 1409, 1413 (E.D. Cal. 1994) (a
showing of bizarre shape is necessary to claim a racial gerrymander). But see Shaw v. Hunt,
861 F. Supp. 408, 431 (E.D.N.C. 1994); Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F. Supp. 1188, 1195 (W.D.
La. 1993), vacated, 114 S. Ct. 2731 (1994).
183. Johnsonv. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1361 (S.D. Ga. 1994), aff'd, 115 S. Ct. 2475
(1995).
184. Id.
185. Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2485 (1995).
186. Id. at 2485.
187. See generallyYick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Gomillian v. Lightfoot,
364 U.S. 339 (1960)(discriminatory intent of city redistricting plan is illustrated by the plan's
dramatic effect upon population areas); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous.
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. at 266 (1977) (where the redistricting pattern is "unexplainable on
grounds other than race ... the evidentiary inquiry is . . . relatively easy."); Personnel
Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (discriminatory purpose can be found
when the legislator acts "because of" and not merely "in spite of" race).
188. In particular, the Court relied heavily upon Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
239 (1976); Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979); Yick Wo v.
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that bizarre shape is a prerequisite to an equal protection claim is illogical,
inconsistent with Fourteenth Amendment precedent, and unsupported by
careful consideration of Shaw v. Reno.'89
B. THE ONE THAT GOT AWAY: THE POLITICAL GERRYMANDER, ALIVE AND
WELL AFTER MILLER

The Miller decision eliminated a significant threat to voting equality:
legislative districts drawn with substantial reliance on racial considerations. 90 In future years, however, Miller may be best known for what
it did not do: eliminate political gerrymandering. While the Supreme Court
has ruled that political gerrymandering claims are justiciable, 9 ' it has done
little to prohibit political gerrymandering.' 92 Instead of tackling the
problem, the Miller Court skirted and even appeared to sanction political
gerrymanders. Analysis of the Constitution and early writers reveals that the
Miller Court should have broadened its application of strict scrutiny to all
gerrymanders, both racial and political.
1. Equal Protection
Over time, Supreme Court justices have made strong Equal Protection
arguments for the unconstitutionality of racial gerrymandering.' 93 These
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
189. Indeed, the Miller Court notes that "[t]he logical import of our reasoning [in
Shaw] is that evidence other than a district's bizarre shape can be used to support the claim."
Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2487.
190. Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995). By definition, a racial gerrymander
subordinates traditional districting factors for considerations of race. To the extent that
substantial considerations of race are no longer justifiable, the Miller decision effectively
eliminated the racial gerrymander.
191. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986)(those claims based upon the Fourteenth
Amendment).
192. In Davis, Indiana Democrats claimed that Republican drawn district lines had
diluted their voting strength. Though ruling that political gerrymandering was a justiciable
issue, the Court denied the Democrats' claims. The Court's rationale is vague and has been
subject to several interpretations. First, it is hypothesized that the Democrats' claim was
simply lacking evidentiary support. Second, some scholars believe that the Court required
political gerrymandering plaintiffs to offer proof that they suffered discrimination comparable
to that of ethnic minorities. BUTLER & CAIM, supra note 2, at 34-35 (1992). The second
interpretation most likely stems from the Court's later decision in Badham v. Eu, 488 U.S.
1024 (1989). In Badham, the Court rejected a political gerrymandering claim brought by
California Republicans. The Court reasoned that the Republicans were not "in the same
position of political exclusions" as were blacks in the South. Id.
193. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 745-65 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring); City
of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 5586 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring); Davis v. Bandemer,
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arguments evolved, incorporating ideas of equal access, 194 equal representation,'9" the prevention of vote dilution, 96 and, most recently, the prevention of race-based classifications.' 97 All of these holdings were
founded upon the premise that the Equal Protection Clause encompasses a
guarantee of equal representation'" regardless of race,'99 and requires
every state to govern impartially.200 The Equal Protection guarantees of
the Constitution apply no less stringently to citizens who entertain different
poliical ideologies.2 '
The opportunity to affect the political process is adversely affected, and
in some cases completely eliminated, by districts gerrymandered to serve the
interests of their creators. Politicians in the Georgia General Assembly
openly admitted to having drawn their districts to avoid contests between
incumbents.20 2 Gerrymandering to preserve incumbent advantage results
in the "representatives selecting the people that they wish to represent, rather
than the people choosing whom they wish to represent them."2 3 Often
478 U.S. 109, 161-85 (1986).

194. See supra notes 18-34 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 36-47 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 48-77 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 78-98 and accompanying text.
198. In Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), the Supreme Court recognized that
Equal Protection encompasses a guarantee of equal representation. The concept of equal
representation requires a state to seek to achieve fair and effective representation of all
citizens when drawing district lines. The ReynoldsCourt also held that an apportionment of
political seats which "contracts the value of some votes and expands that of others" is
unconstitutional, since the "Federal Constitution intends that when qualified voters elect
members of Congress each vote be given as much weight as any other vote." Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 559 (1964) (citing Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964)). The Court
stated that it would defeat the constitutional principle of equal representation to allow state
legislatures to draw lines in such a way as to give some voters a greater voice in choosing
a Congressman than others. The Court also recognized that redistricting should be based
upon a number of neutral criteria. Id. See also Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 745-65
(1983) (holding that the guarantee of equal representation is firmly grounded in the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
199. Equal protection applies with equal force regardless of "the race of those burdened
or benefitted by a particular classification." Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2485 (1995)
(citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989), and Adarand
Constr'rs Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 2102 (1995)).
200. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 745-65 (1983).
201. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986); Badham v. Eu, 488 U.S. 1024
(1989). As Justice Stevens remarked: "The [Equal Protection Clause] does not make some
groups of citizens more equal than others; its protection against vote dilution cannot be
confined to racial groups." Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 748-49 (1983).
202. Miller v. Johnson, 115 S.Ct. 2475, 2485, 2489 (1995).
203. See Brief for Amicus Curiae William C. Owens, Jr., in Support of Appellees at 8,

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

politicians have less political but equally selfish districting goals in mind.
One Georgia Senator admitted to having redrawn the 11th District to include
the precinct where his son lived.2" 4 The Miller decision appears to sanction
the consideration of such "political" factors, elevating them to the status of
"legitimate state interests." It is obvious that the Miller Court naively
confused the interest of the State, with the interests of the State's politicians.
"[F]air and effective representation for all citizens"2 5 is inconsistent with
the ruthlessly ambitious, self-preserving interests of career politicians. If the
Miller Court truly believed that the Equal Protection Clause encompasses the
right of all citizens to affect the political process,2"6 then the constitutionality of political gerrymandering should also have been called into question. 2°7
2. The Guarantee Clause
Arguments against political gerrymandering can also be supported by
the Constitution's Guarantee Clause, found in Article IV, Section 4 of the
Constitution.2 ' "[T]he right to vote is inherent in the Republican form of
government envisaged by Article IV, section 4.,219 Since legislative
redistricting plans affect voting procedures, they are subject to the limitations imposed by the Guarantee Clause. 0 Article IV, section 4, however,
encompasses more than just the right to vote. In Number 39 of The
Federalist, James Madison vehemently argued that a republican form of
government must "be derived from the great body of society, not from an
Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
204. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2503.
205. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565-66 (1964).
206. As the Court has long held. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
207. While political ideology is not an immutable characteristic, as is race, participation
in political parties has long been recognized by the history and traditions of our country.
Effective political participation is, at the very least, fundamental to our form of government.
208. "The United States shall guarantee to every state in this Union a Republican form
of Government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and on application of the
legislature, or of the Executive (when the legislature cannot be convened) against domestic
violence." U.S. CONST. art. IV., § 4.
209. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 242 (1962).
210. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 591 (1964)("legislative apportionments... are
wholly free from constitutional limitations save as such may be imposed by the Republican
Form of Government."). But see id. at 582 ("[S]ome questions iaised under the Guarantee

Clause are not justiciable, where political in nature and where there is a clear absence of
judicially manageable standards."). James Madison argues that the existing government has
an obligation to defend itself against aristocratic innovations which may threaten the
republican form. THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison).
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' Implicit
inconsiderable portion, or a favored class of it."211
in Madison's
argument is the concept of equal opportunity for representation regardless
of either race or ideology.212 Ironically, early Constitutionalists prophesied
the development of political factions and feared that these special interests
would come to interfere with accurate calculation of the electorate's
will.21 3 With the power to redraw district lines in a manner furthering
incumbency advantage,2 14 politicians need not heed the voice of their
constituents. Once drawn to preserve the power of its creator, district lines
may be slightly altered to accommodate the needs of the highest bidder.
One need only review the ACLU's gross manipulation of the Department
of Justice and Georgia Legislature 215 to see that the fears of the early theorists were well founded.

3. Freedom of Speech and Association
In addition to being antithetical to Equal Protection principles and our
republican form of government, political gerrymandering offends basic First
Amendment guarantees. Partisan gerrymanders manipulate legislative
district lines to advantage or disadvantage certain political groups. 216 This
manipulation amplifies some political speech and mutes others. Without an
effective political voice, the potential for minority interests to affect
government is effectively nullified.2 7 Political gerrymandering can
infringe upon First Amendment associational rights in a similar manner.
When a community of interest is split" 8 by district lines, the community
is deprived of its potential to exert force in numbers. As noted by Justice
Douglas, "cumbersome election machinery can effectively suffocate the right

211. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison).
212. Justice Frankfurter recognized this in Baker when he held that the case was "in
effect a Guarantee Clause claim masquerading under a different label." Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 297 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
213. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison); George Washington's Farewell
Address reprintedin 11 THE GUIDE TO AMERICAN LAW 375-76 (1985).
214. Entrenched incumbency is a direct result of political gerrymandering and was a
great fear of Constitutional writers. Acknowledging that "those who have power in their
hands will not give it up while they can retain it," entrenched incumbency was considered
undesirable in colonial times. James Madison, Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention
of 1787, at 266. Term limits were often suggested, but were not incorporated into the final
copy of the Constitution. Id.
215. See supra notes 121-122 and accompanying text.
216. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
217. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958).
218. Splitting communities of interest is not the only way to diminish the relative voting
power. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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of association, the promotion of political ideas, [the] progress of political
action, . . . and the right to vote. '
When a community of interest is
split to serve the selfish needs of politicians and special factions, that
community's speech and associational rights become, at best, illusory.22
IV. PRACTICAL IMPACT: MILLER'S EFFECT UPON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

Affirmative action proponents are outraged with the Miller decision
and
22
"
allege that it represents a setback to minority representation. ' A close
and thoughtful review of the Court's decision reveals otherwise. The Miller
decision will have no effect upon government affirmative action programs
since the decision did not add or detract from existing policies which
regulate the use of remedial efforts.222 Instead, the Court's decision simply
reaffirmed the now long established premise that "racial and ethnic
distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most
exacting judicial scrutiny."'223 Affirmative remedies narrowly tailored to
eliminate the residual effects of discrimination are still permissible, even
under the strictest interpretations of the Court's opinion. 2 4 Miller's
greatest impact stems from its prohibition of majority-minority districts
drawn with substantial reliance upon race. However, this prohibition does
not arise from new rules promulgated in Miller, but rather from restoration
of the original intent of the Voting Rights Act.
The Miller decision did not eliminate the availability of affirmative
action as a remedy for past discrimination. To the contrary, Miller clearly
recognized that the State has a significant interest in "eradicating the effects
'
of past discrimination."225
The belief that Miller eliminated affirmative
action stems from confusion about the Court's rejection of Georgia's 'black

219. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 39 (1968).
220. Id.
221. Richard Lacayo, The Soul of a New Majority, TIME, July 10, 1995, at 46. Soon
after the Miller decision, a member of the Congressional Black Caucus was quoted as
saying, "[w]e're not going to stand back and let five people who are out of touch with reality
determine our future ... we're going to initiate massive voter registration drives and voter
education sessions." Id.
222. The Miller Court perpetuated the use of strict scrutiny which has consistently been
applied to discrimination cases since Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978). See also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson
Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2673 (1993).
223. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2482 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438

U.S. 265, 291 (1978)).
224. Id. at 2490.
225. Id.
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maximization' policy.22 6 Georgia's legislative redistricting plan was not
rejected because it was an affirmative action measure, but rather because it
was not.227 Georgia's plan was completely unrelated to remedial or
ameliorative goals.22 To justify the use of race-based measures to remedy
past discrimination, the state must have "convincing evidence that remedial
action is necessary ... [and a] strong basis in evidence of the harm to be
remedied."2'29 Miller did not create a heightened standard for affirmative
action remedies, but rather sent a clear signal that racial remedies are
inappropriate in the absence of racial discrimination.
The greatest repercussions from the Miller decision emanate from its
prohibition of majority-black districts created under the under the guise of
"compliance" with the Voting Rights Act.230 The Voting Rights Act was
never intended to justify the creation of majority-minority districts absent
evidence of discrimination. 3 ' As Miller correctly noted, the Voting Rights
Act was intended to prevent retrogressionof minority voting strength.232

Majority-minority districts are maximization tools and are not narrowly

tailored to prevent retrogression. Restored to the colorblind status that
Congress originally intended, the Voting Rights Act can no longer be used

to justify indiscriminate creation of majority-minority districts.233

Thus,

226. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2484 (citing Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1368
(1994) ("It became obvious that [the Justice Department] would accept nothing less than
abject surrender to its maximization policy."))
227. Id. at 2490-91. The State of Georgia, even in its written briefs to the Supreme
Court, never alleged that their districting plan was intended to remedy the effects of past
racial discrimination. Id. The Court notes, "[i]nstead of grounding its objections on evidence
of discriminatory purpose, it would appear that the government was driven by its policy of
maximizing majority-black districts." Id. at 2492.
228. Id. at 2491.
229. Id. (citing Wygant v. Jackson, 476 U.S. 267, 276-77 (1986); Shaw v. Reno, 113
S. Ct. 2816, 2832 (1993); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 500-01 (1989).
230. The Court notes that the Voting Rights Act was never intended to permit "the far
reaching application of section 5 utilized by the Department of Justice in creating Georgia's
three majority-black districts. Miller,115 S. Ct. at 2490-93. Kennedy concludes, "[i]t takes
a shortsighted and unauthorized view of the Voting Rights Act to invoke that statute...
to demand the very racial stereotyping the Fourteenth Amendment forbids." Id. at 2494.
231. Id. at 2490-94.
232. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2493. "Section 5 was directed at preventing a particular set
of invidious practices which had the effect of 'undoing or defeating the rights recently won
by nonwhite voters."' Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2493 (citing H.R. REP. No. 91397 at 8 (1969)). See supra text accompanying notes 19-35.
233. Thus, while Millerdid not determine whether compliance with the Voting Rights
Act can justify majority-black districts, it is likely that it cannot. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 249091.
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the greatest impacts from the decision will not be seen until after the next
decennial census.
Contrary to the view of Justice O'Connor,234 Miller does cast doubt
upon the legitimacy of existing majority-black districts.235 In the past
decade, the number of minority representatives in Congress has nearly
doubled.236 Most of these representatives were elected by majority-minority districts.237 The Court has already agreed to hear race-based districting
cases in both Texas and North Carolina. There will certainly be more suits,
though it is impossible to determine how many. One thing is certain; those
plaintiffs who prove that race was the predominant motivating factor in the
creation of district lines will be victorious-but after 200 years of race-based
stereotypes, that is a victory we all can celebrate.
CONCLUSION

While reviewing the Georgia State Legislature's attempt to draw a
political district in a manner substantially motivated by race, Miller v.
Johnson exposed a fallacy which served as the foundation for eighteenth-,
nineteenth-, and twentieth-century barriers to minority franchise rights: the
idea that minority groups act and vote similarly. By perpetuating this
stereotype, majority-minority districts threaten the very right which they
seek to protect. Treading lightly through the political thicket of redistricting, the Miller Court managed to disarm this threat by prohibiting political
districts drawn with substantial reliance upon race. When combined with
the Reconstruction Amendments and the Voting Rights Act, Miller's
rejection of racial voting classifications has finally answered the cry of civil
rights activists for total equality.
DARIN R. DOAK

234. Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. at 2497 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice
O'Connor stated that the Court's decision "does not throw into doubt the vast majority of the
nation's 435 congressional districts, where presumably the States have drawn the boundaries
in accordance with their customary districting principles." Id.
235. Justice O'Connor's statement presumes that current majority-minority districts are
'coincidentally' majority-minority and were drawn primarily through consideration of
traditional districting principles. However, the vast majority of minority districts were drawn
with the sole intention of complying with Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Most
majority-minority districts are thus susceptible to court review.
236. Lacayo, supra note 221, at 46.
237. After the 1990 redistricting and subsequent 1992 elections, the number of AfricanAmerican members of the Congress rose from 26 to 40. Almost all of these representatives
were elected from majority-black districts.
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The Original Gerrymander

APPENDIX B

Chart showing Tuskegee, Alabama,
Before and After Redistricting.

The entire square comprised the city prior to redistricting.
The black figure within the square represents the city after redistricting.
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Shaw v. Reno District

APPENDIX D

Proposed 11th District
under Max-Black plan

